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STATEMENT I )!• TMK ISSUES 
JL NO. I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS CONTRARY TO THE 
FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE STATE OF THE LAW AND SHOULD 
BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-5 IN THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED 
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS 
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE. 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-10 IN THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED 
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS 
nTr
 A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE. 
. IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED VARIOUS NASD RULES IN THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY 
APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A 
VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE 
PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION 
OF THIS RULE AND THAT SEVERAL OF THE STATED RULES DO NOT AND 
DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION. 
ISSUE NO. V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT 
AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, ARE NOT AVAILABLE WITHOUT 
A FINDING OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNLESS 
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HER COUNTERCLAIM. 
ISSUE NO. VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING MATTERS 
WHICH WERE NOT AT ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, ARE NOT 
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE FACTS OR ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. THE 
IMPROPER MATTERS INCLUDE THAT A STOCK SALE CANNOT TAKE PLACE 
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE IN POSSESSION; THAT PLAINTIFF 
ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE DEFENDANT'S STOCK TO PREVENT PROFIT 
TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT; THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE 
DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL; THAT THE REASON 
THE DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED HER STOCK CERTIFICATE FROM THE 
TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME ALLEGED SCHEME; THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE TRANSACTIONS WITHIN 
FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION; THAT A CONVERSISON OF 
DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED; THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY 
OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER 
VENTURE CONSOLIDATED INC.; THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING 
PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED. 
STATUTES AND RULES VERBATIM 
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange— 
Sec. 10(b) To use or employ, inconnection with the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national exchange or 
any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors. 
Section 28 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Sec. 28 <a) The rights and remedies provided by this 
title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and 
remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person 
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the 
provisions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction 
of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess 
of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. 
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the 
securities commission <or any agency or officer performing 
like functions) of any State over any securities or any 
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisins of 
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. No 
State law which prohibits or regulates the making or 
promoting of wagering or gaming contracts, or the operation 
of "bucket shops" or other similar or related activities, 
shall invalidate any put, call, straddle, option, privilege, 
or other security, or apply to any activity which is 
incidental or related to the offer, purchase, sale, 
exercise, settlement, or closeout of any such instrument, if 
such instrument is traded pursuant to rules and regulations 
of a self-regulatory organization that are filed with the 
Commission pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act. 
UCft 7QA-8-319 
A Contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless 
<a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker 
sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for 
sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a 
defined or stated price; or 
(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment 
has been made but the contract is enforceable under this 
provision only to the extent of such delivery or payment; or 
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of 
the sale or purchase and sufficient against the sender under 
paragraph (a) has been received by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought and he has failed to send written 
objection to its contents within ten days after its receipt; 
or 
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought actaiits in 
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of described 
securities at a defined or stated price. 
Securities and Exchange Comroiggipn Rvle lPfr-5 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, 
<b> to make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, or 
<c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Securities and Exchange Cpromissipn Rvle IQfr-lQ 
See Addendum attached hereto. 
National Aggo^utipn pf Securities Dealers Sectjpn 12 
Sec. 12. A member at or before the completion of each 
transaction with a customer shall give or send to such 
customer written notification disclosing <1> whether such 
member is acting as a broker for such customer, as a dealer 
for his own account, as a broker for some other person, or 
as a broker for such customer and some other person; and (2) 
in any case in which such member is acting as a broker for 
such customer or for both such customer, and some other 
person, either the name of the person from whom the security 
was purchased or to whom it was sold for such customer and 
the date and time when such transaction took place or the 
fact that such information will be furnished upon the 
request of such customer, and the source and amount of any 
commission or other remuneration received or to be received 
by such member in connection with the transact ion. 
National ftggpcUUon of gggyritUg Dealer? gecUpn 19 
Sec. 18. No member shall effect any transaction in, or 
induce the purchase or sale of, any security by means of any 
manipulative, deceptive or other fradulent device or 
contrivance. 
National Association of Securities Dealers Section 21(a&b) 
Sec. 21. 
Requirements 
(a) Each member shall keep and preserve books, 
accounts, records, memorandum, and correspondence in 
conformity with all applicable laws, rules, regulations and 
statements of policy promulgated thereunder and with the 
rules of this Association. 
Information on accounts 
<b) Each member shall maintain accounts of customers in 
such form and manner as to show the following information: 
name, address, and whether the customer is legally of age; 
the signature of the registered representative introducing 
the account and the signature of the member or the partner, 
officer or manager accepting the account for the member. If 
the customer is associated with or employed by another 
member, this fact must be noted. In discretionary accounts, 
the member shall also record the age or approximate age and 
occupation of the customer as well as the signature of each 
person authorized to exercise discretion in such account. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND SECURITIES, 
INC. 
Plaint iff-Appellant, 
-v-
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
No. 870056 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose out of the sale of securities by the 
Defendant and her failure to deliver the certificate to 
finalize the transaction resulting in a purchase of 
securities to close the sale transaction. A Complaint was 
filed on December 19, 1984 for recovery of the loss 
occasioned by the failure to deliver the certificate for the 
securities sold. A Counterclaim was filed and amended 
alleging violations of Rule 10b-5, Rule lOb-10 and various 
NASD rules. Trial was held October 16 and 20, 1986 before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. Judgment was entered 
November 10, 1986 in favor of the Defendant for punitive 
damages only in the amount of $10,000. A Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
was filed on November 10, 1986 and denied February 3, 1987. 
Appeal was taken to this Court by the Plaintiff on February 
3, 1987. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff is a securities Broker-Dealer licensed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah 
Securities Division. (Page 7). Defendant was a customer who 
purchased securities through Plaintiff and numerous other 
brokerage firms in Salt lake and Ogden, Utah. (Page 10, 72, 
416, 422, 463). 
Prior to 1984, Defendant purchased in an Underwriting 
through Plaintiff 20,000 shares of stock of Venture 
Consolidated, Inc. (Venture) for a total price of *200.0Q. 
(Page 416). The offering of the Venture stock was an 
unspecified purpose offering wherein Venture proposed to 
raise funds and then attempt to enter into a profitable 
business opportunity. Pursuant to the Underwriting, the 
Transfer Agent, Interwest Transfer, was to deliver directly 
to the Defendant, her purchased shares of stock. (Page 417). 
On July 26, 1984, Venture proposed the adoption by the 
shareholders of a proposition to acquire for stock, Big 0 
Tires, Inc., Snow Bros., Inc., S&H Corporation and D&J 
Corporation, all of which were Utah franchisees of Big 0 
Tires. (Exhibit 2P). Defendant acknowledged receipt of 
Notice of this proposed merger. (Page 401). The Venture 
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Shareholders approved the aquisit ions on September 27, 1984 
at a special meeting of shareholders and changed the name of 
the Corporation to Tires, Inc. (Tires) and also approved a 
20 for 1 reverse split* (Page 72). 
On or about September 13, 1984, Plaintiff's 
representative, Louis Babcock (Babcock) went to Defendant's 
place of business and notified Defendant that her shares of 
Venture had increased from $.01 to approximately *.15 tO 
••17 per share and asked if Defendant desired to sell her 
shares. (Page 410-2,25). Defendant declined. (Page 425-6). 
Defendant later attempted to contact Babcock, and being 
unable to do so, contacted Plaintiff's office in Salt Lake 
City where she spoke to Richard Davis (Davis), a registered 
representative for Plaintiff. (Page 440-3). After a 
lengthly discussion Defendant requested the sale of her 
shares of stock of Venture and also requested that the 
commission on the sale be given to Babcock. (Page 444). 
Davis, not knowing how to accomplish the sale with 
commission being payable to Babcock, and while the Defendant 
waited on the phone, contacted Richard L. Parker, the 
Executive Vice President of Plaintiff regarding 
instructions. (Page 445). Parker wrote a trade ticket 
showing the method to ensure the commission was payable to 
- 4 -
Babcock and delivered the ticket to Davis who took the 
ticket to Plaintiff's Trading Department which Department 
accepted the sale order at *.17 per share. (Page 445-6)• 
Davis then returned to the phone and informed Defendant of 
the sale and the price of the sale. (Page 448). Several 
days later, Defendant again contacted Davis and indicated 
she had changed her mind and did not want to sell her stock. 
(Page 447-8). Davis informed her that she could not cancel 
the trade. She asked what to do and Davis requested she 
contact her representative, Babcock, for specific 
instructions. (Page 448). Defendant failed to deliver the 
stock certificate and Plaintiff's Financial Principal, Kim 
H. Johnson, (Johnson) contacted Babcock and instructed him 
to contact Defendant concerning the certificate. (Page 469). 
Babcock contacted Defendant and she indicated she would 
deliver the certificate to Plaintiff's office in Salt Lake. 
(Page 469). Approximately one week passed and having not 
received the certificate, Johnson again contacted Babcock 
and instructed him to contact Defendant. Babcock contacted 
Defendant and was informed that Defendant could not find her 
certificate. Babcock told her how to obtain replacement of 
the certificate from Interwest Transfer. (Page 471). 
Defendant indicated she would get her husband's help in 
- 5 -
finding the certificate. (Page 471, 502). Again a length of 
time passed and the certificate was not delivered. Johnson 
again contacted Babcock and he again contacted Defendant. 
(Page 501-2). She indicated she could not find the 
certificate and had never received it from Interwest 
Transfer after the initial underwriting. (Page 471). 
Babcock again informed Defendant of the method to replace 
the stock certificate. (Page 471). 
Defendant then contacted Plaintiff and spoke with 
Johnson. Defendant told Johnson that she had done the trade 
with Davis. (Page 502-4). Defendant indicated she did not 
have the stock. (Page 504). Johnson explained the 
replacement procedures, (Page 505) though also informed her 
that if she did not deliver the certificate prior to 
November 30, 1984, that Plaintiff would buy in stock to 
cover her sale and she would be responsible for any losses. 
(Page 505). Defendant became angry and requested the 
cancellation of the sale. (Page 505). Johnson again 
reiterated the need to deliver the stock certificate and 
ended the conversation.(Page 505). 
Defendant failed to deliver the certificate and on 
November 30, 1984, Plaintiff purchased for Defendant's 
account, stock to cover Defendant's failure to deliver her 
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certificate. (Page 505). On December 12, 1984, Plaintiffs 
Counsel notified Defendant of the condition of her account 
and requested payment of the difficiency created due to 
Defendants failure to deliver the stock certificate. 
(Exhibit 5D). Payment was not received and on December 19, 
1984, suit was filed by Plaintiff requesting payment. (Page 
7), Defendant counterclaimed violation of 10b-5 and lOb-10 
of the Securities Act of 1934 and various NASD regulations. 
(Page 70). Trial was held before Judge John F. Wahlquist 
and Judgment was entered November 10, 1986 awarding 
Defendant punitive damages in the amount of $10,000. (Page 
295). Plaintiff made a motion to Alter or Amend the 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree (Page 299) which Motion 
Judge Wahlquist denied on February 3, 1987 (Page 318) and 
Plaintiff appealed both the Judgment and the denial of the 
Motion to Alter or Amend. Appeal was filed February 3, 
1987. (Page 333). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT NO. I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS CONTRARY TO THE 
FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE STATE OF THE LAW AND SHOULD 
BE REVERSED AND JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE AMOUNT PRAYED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
ARGUMENT NO. II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-5 IN THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED 
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS 
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE. 
ARGUMENT NO. Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE 10B-10 IN THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED 
ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS 
OF A VIOLATION OF THIS RULE. 
ARGUMENT NO. IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
VIOLATED VARIOUS NASD RULES IN THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
VIOLATION OF NASD RULES, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY 
APPLY THE FACTS TO THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR SUCH A 
VIOLATION AND DID NOT FIND ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE 
PLAINTIFF TO SUPPORT THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION 
OF THIS RULE AND THAT SEVERAL OF THE STATED RULES DO NOT AND 
DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION. 
ARGUMEMT NO. V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT 
AVAILABLE PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, ARE NOT AVAILABLE WITHOUT 
A FINDING OF ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNLESS 
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HER COUNTERCLAIM. 
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ARGUMENT NO. VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING MATTERS 
WHICH WERE NOT AT ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, ARE NOT 
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE FACTS OR ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. THE 
IMPROPER MATTERS INCLUDE THAT A STOCK SALE CANNOT TAKE PLACE 
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE IN POSSESSION; THAT PLAINTIFF 
ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE DEFENDANT'S STOCK TO PREVENT PROFIT 
TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT; THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE 
DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL; THAT THE REASON 
THE DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED HER STOCK CERTIFICATE FROM THE 
TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME ALLEGED SCHEME; THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE TRANSACTIONS WITHIN 
FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION; THAT A CONVERSISON OF 
DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED; THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY 
OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER 
VENTURE CONSOLIDATED INC.; THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING 
PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED. 
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ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT NO. I PLAINTIFF'S CASE 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE ENTERED INTO BY 
THE PARTIES. 
According to the Restatement of Contracts 2d Section 
17, the formation of a contract requires a bargin in where 
there is a manifestation of mental assent to the exchange 
and a consideration. The testimony of Davis clearly shows 
that the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff and entered into 
a contract for the sale of 20,000 shares of Venture 
Consolidated stock (now Tires, Inc.). There was an 
agreement to sell shares with the Plaintiff paying for the 
shares and the Defendant agreeing to transfer ownership. 
Thus there was a bargin, mutually agreed upon with 
consideration given on both sides. The Defendant agreed to 
sell her shares and Plaintiff agreed to purchase the 
shares.(Page 440-8). The testimony of Parker supports 
Davis7 testimony in that he corrorborates the testimony as 
to the conversation on the date of the sale of the stock. 
(Page 561). Davis7 testimony of the conversation in which 
the sale contract was entered into is further corroborated 
by Davis testimony of the subsequent conversation where the 
Defendant admitted the existence of the contract. (Page 
- 10 -
447-8). Exhibit 3P, the trade ticket, which was prepared on 
the date of the sale conversation clearly evidences the 
sale, confirms the price, date, number of shares, and 
participants to the transaction. Defendants self-serving 
denial after suit was filed cannot overcome the evidence of 
the contract. The District Court recognized the existence 
of the conversation on the date of the sale in its Findings 
thus acknowledging that the Defendant had lied while 
testifying that she never made the call on that date. (Page 
288-9). Defendant's claim that it was all a scheme to get 
her shares of stock and that the conversation didn't occur 
is belied since Davis would not have known if or how many 
shares the Defendant had in Venture Consolidated since the 
shares were not in the Plaintiffs possession. That fact 
that Davis knew how many shares Defendant posssessed 
confirms not only the conversation but Defendant's desire to 
sell a specified number of shares. The price rise and 
potential profit on the sale is consistent with the District 
Court's findings that the Defendant invested Hin new issues 
which will hopefully achieve a quick rise in value." (Page 
287). Defendant's knowledge of the sale, which she denies, 
is further evidenced by the testimony of Davis that the 
Defenant called him again shortly after the sale and said 
- 11 -
she had changed her mind about the sale. (Page 447). The 
District Court in its Memorandum Decision recognized the 
existence of this conversation. (Page 279). Further the 
Defendant admitted to Johnson that she had done the trade 
with Davis. (Page 504). 
The Babcock testimony shows that not only did the 
Defendant know of the sale, but that she intended to 
complete her portion of the sale by delivering the stock to 
the Plaintiff. (Page 470). 
The District Court in its Findings acknowledged that 
the Defendant requested the sale but the Dictrict Court 
stated that the Defendant's state of mind to be that she 
believed she could get out of the sale because she had a 
sale previously cancelled. (Page 289). There is no 
obligation on the part of the Plaintiff, especially once it 
has performed its part of the contract, to agree to void a 
contract of sale. The Defendant did not notify the 
Plaintiff at the time of the sale contract of her belief 
that she couuld get out of the transactions. The District 
Court infers in its Memorandum Decision that the Plaintiff 
knew of or participated in some scheme so that Defendant 
would not have her certificate. (Page 277). The evidence 
shows that the Transfer Agent, Interwest Transfer, had the 
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responsibility to deliver the Certificate to the Defendant 
and the the Defendant knew that she could get a replacement 
of the certificate through the Transfer Agent. (Page 417)• 
An unmarked Exhibit is a letter from the Defendant to the 
Transfer Agent which she testified she sent to the Transfer 
Agent. (Page 574). The letter clearly shows that prior to 
or contemporaneously with the sale contract the Defendant 
knew she didn/t have her certificate and that the Transfer 
Agent could replace it for her. That a participant to a 
contract believes she can cancel 1 a sale later, even if that 
participant honestly believes that to be true, when the 
other party has given no indication that it will allow such 
a cancellation, is not grounds to determine a contract was 
never entered into. According to the Restatement of 
Contracts 2nd Section 153, a contract is voidable only if 
the mistake was known to the other party or the effect is 
such that enforcement of the contract would be 
unconscionable. That the Defendant would have to complete a 
sale that she agreed to is clearly not unconscionable 
especially when the terms were as agreed by the Defendant. 
The Defendant has never shown otherwise. 
Pursuant to the request of the Defendant, a sale of 
20,000 shares of stock was entered into. The fact that the 
- 13 -
Plaintiff purchased the shares for itself does not does not 
make the sale invalid. The Defendant knew that the 
Plaintiff was a Securities Broker-Dealer who purchased stock 
for itself. That the Plaintiff purchased the stock because 
it believed it could make money by so purchasing does not 
void the sale. If this were the case, then any contract for 
the purchase of an investment would be invalid. 
Proof that the sale accured is further evidenced by the 
Plainitff/s records which are consistent in evidencing the 
date, price, number of shares sold, and participants to the 
contract. (See Exhibits 7P, 3P, 6P, the trade ticket, 
confirmation, quarterly account statment.) The testimony of 
Johnson, the keeper of the records (Page 493) shows the 
records to have been found in the place and order in the 
business records of the Plaintiff as was appropriate for the 
date and time of those records. (Page 495-6). The testimony 
and documents clearly show that a contract for sale between 
the Plaintiff and Defendant was entered into. As reflected 
on the Account Statement (Exhibit 6P), the Plaintiff 
completed its part of the contract by crediting to the 
Defendants account payment for the shares sold. The 
parties mutually agreed to the sale of a fixed number of 
shares, at a specified price, with consideration agreed to 
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be given by both parties. The Plaintiff completed its 
portion of the contract and the Defendant connot now avoid 
her respopnsibi1ities under the contract. 
Subsequent to the entry of the contract, the Defendant 
failed and refused to delilver the required share 
certificate to the Plaintiff. In order to close out 
Defendants account and supply the required certificates, 
the Plaintiff purchased at or below the fair market price, 
sufficient shares of stock to cover the Defendants sale. 
(Page 505-7). There is no evidence contradicting this. 
According to the testimony and as shown on the 
confirmations of purchase and the account statments 
(Exhibits 4P, 6P) the purchase price of the shares was 
$8,625.00 which left a balance due and owing to the 
Plaintiff by the Defendant of $5,402.20 for which Plaintiff 
filed suit and for which it should receive judgment together 
with attorney's fees and costs. 
The Defendant in her Amended Counter-Claim claims that 
the contract is unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of 
Frauds. The District Court in its Findings, without any 
specificity as to the Statute of Frauds, stated that the 
Plaintiff failed to give notice of the sale transaction. 
(Page 289). The Court in its Memorandum Decision stated 
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"The question of whether or not a notice of this transaction 
was mailed out or not is in conflict. The Court concludes 
that the Plaintiff has failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such a notice was given.8 
(Page 277). These are the only references to the notice of 
the sale. The Plaintiff contends that the Court did not 
rule that the contract was unenforceable pursuant to the 
Statute of Frauds and therefore the District Court erred in 
not enforcing the contract of sale. However, the sale 
should be enforced since it complied with the Statute of 
Frauds. Utah Code 70A-8-319 states that a securities 
contract is not enforceable unless within a reasonable time 
a confirmation of the sale has been received by the 
defendant and the defendant has not within ten days sent 
written objection to the contents of the confirmation. The 
Defendant in her testimony admits that she did not send 
written objection to the confirmation of the sale. (Page 
438). The only question is whether the confirmation was 
received. The law is clear that where there is proof that 
an item has been duly mailed a presumtion of receipt by the 
sendee arises. 29 Am Jur 2d, 193; Campbell vs. Gowans 35 
Utah 268, 100 P 397 affirmed in Thiessens v. Department of 
Employment Security, Board of Review of the Industrial 
- 16 -
Commission of Utah 663 P2d 72; Lieb v. Webster 190 P2d 701; 
Olsen v. Davidson 350 P2d 338. 
The testimony of Johnson was that the confirmation was 
generated by computer which typed the address on the 
confirmation and that the address on Exhibit 3P, the 
PIainitiffs copy of the confirmation, was computer 
generated and would show the same address as on the original 
confirmation sent to the defendant. (Page 513). The 
Defendant confirmed that the address on Exhibit 3P is her 
address and had been at the time of the sale. (Page 438). 
The Defendant has denied receipt of this confirmation. 
However, the unsupported denial of receipt by an addressee 
ought to be received with the greatest amount of caution. 
In Re Imperial Land Co. (1872) L.R. 15 Eq (Eng) 18. Further 
the court in Ren land v. First National Bank 90 Mont. 424, 4 
P2d 488 (1931) stated that positive testimony of nonreceipt 
does not overcome the presumption of delivery. See also 
Olsen v. Davidson, Supra, where the Court stated that mere 
denial of receipt does not rise to the dignity of a bona 
fide rebuttal of such presumption. Similarly First National 
Bank of Denver v. Henning 150 P2d 790. Additionally, in 
Wenger v. Success Manufacturing Co. 227 F2d 548 (1915) the 
Court stated that denial of receipt does not overcome the 
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presumption of receipt especially when the sendee actaitted 
receiving previous notices sent to the same address. The 
Defendant in her testimony admits to having received 
subsequent mailings from the Plaintiff (Page 438) which were 
generated in the same manner* (Page 512). 
The question that remains is whether the confirmation 
was mailed. The Court in Lieb v. Webster, Supra, stated the 
where an office handles such a large volume of business that 
no one could be expected to remember any particular notice 
or letter, proof of mailing may be made by showing an office 
custom with respect to the mailing and compliance with such 
custom in the specific instance. The testimony of Johonson, 
Plaintiff's office manager, sets forth the office custom as 
it relates to mailing business correspondence including 
confirmations. (Page 507-14). That testimony clearly 
indicates a system was in place during the time of this sale 
by the Defendant. It clearly provides accurate addressing 
and affixing of postage to each confirmation. It clearly 
shows he is responsible for the system and was personally 
involved with the system. Further, Johnson testified that 
while he didn't remember that specific confirmation he 
specifically remembered handing the stack of confirmations 
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to the clerk who posted the confirmations and he watched her 
leave for the post box* (Page 521). 
The Court in Tabor & Co. v. Gorinz 356 NE2nd 1150 
(1976) reinterated that mailing could be established by 
evidence of corroborative circumstances tending to establish 
the fact that the custom had been followed in the particular 
instance and stated that those corroborative circumstances 
would include evidence that the confirmation forms were 
created so that the correct sendees address would show on 
the envelope, and that the senders return address was 
imprinted on the envelope, that the sendee acta itted 
receiving mailings made pursuant to the same business 
practice close in time to the transactions in question and 
that the disputed item had not been returned. The Court 
stated that this would be sufficient even in the absense of 
the testimony of the clerk who would have mailed the 
letters. 
As the testimony sets forth in this case, the 
confirmation of the sale was generated by computer with the 
address on the envelope imprinted as on the confirmation and 
as on the copy kept by the Plaintiff. (Page 513). The 
Defendant acknowledged the address on the Plainitff/s copy 
of the confirmation to be her address. (Page 438). Further, 
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the Defendant admitted (Page 438) to having received other 
documents which were mailed pursuant to the same procedure 
at ot near the same time. (Page 512). And also, the 
confirmation of sale which Defendant denies receiving was 
never returned to the Plaintiff and if it had been returned 
it would have been seggregated in a separate file. Johnson 
testified that he personally checked that file for return of 
the sale confirmation and it was not in the file. (Page 
513). 
In the case Pence Mortgage Co. v. Stokes 559 SW2d 500, 
a mailing was sufficiently established if the above steps 
were shown and if the copy of the notification which was 
sent to he insurance agent was received by the agent. The 
Defendant's Agent, Babcock, testified he received his copy 
of the notification of the sale (called a can buy). (Page 
472 & 478). 
The evidence clearly shows a mailing custom which was 
adhered to in the instant case thus raising the presumption 
of receipt and therefore the contract in enforceable. 
The District Court in its Findings indicated tha the 
Plaintiff should be estopped from collecting the amount due 
to it since the Plaintiff waited to buy-in securities to 
cover the sale and non-delivery in the Defendant's account. 
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In the case Billings Associates v. Bashaw, NY Supreme Court 
Appellate Division, January 19, 1967, 276 NYS 2d 446 (1967) 
the Court stated that the failure of a broker to liquidate a 
securities transaction until one month after the customer 
failed to pay for the transaction was no bar to his action 
against his customer for damages but the time period may 
determine the amount of damages which the broker sustained. 
In this action the Plaintiff did not buy-in the Defendants 
account until November 30, 1984. The testimony indicates 
tha the Defendant after the sale indicated she would bring 
in the certificate (Page 470); then that she had lost the 
certificate (Page 471); and again later she called the 
Plaintiff and said she had lost the certificate (Page 504) 
and was given a date on which the buy-in would occur which 
date was November 30, 1984. (Page 505). The Defendant's 
conduct in stating that she would bring in the certificate 
on several occasions should in fact work an estoppel of her 
right to claim the sale should have been bought-in earlier. 
Further, the Defendant at any time could have made a 
purchase to close out the previous sale. She never did so, 
instead she continued to to say she would bring in the the 
certificate. The Defendant now claims that the Plaintiff 
should have bought in her account after the first 
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conversation with Davis a week or so after the sale because 
she claims she told Davis she had changed her mind about the 
sale. (Page 447). She was told she couldn't cancel the sale 
and when she asked what to do she was told to contact her 
broker, Babcock. (Page 448). She didn't contact her broker, 
but when he contacted her, she didn't say to cancel the 
sale, she said she would bring in the certificate. (Page 
470). The Plaintiff withheld buying-in the Defendant's 
account based upon the Defendant's statements that she would 
bring in the stock. It is the Defendant and not the 
Plaintiff who should be estopped from relief. 
ARGUMENT NO. II - RULE 1QB-5 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE 
10B-5. 
The elements which must be shown in order to make a 
finding of violation of Securities and Exchange Act Rule 
10b-5 are as follows: 
a) The person alleging the violation must be a 
purchaser or seller. 
b) There must be the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device as set forth in the statute itself. 
c) Scienter must be plead and proved by the one 
claiming a violation. 
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d) There must be actual damages. 
A) Purchaser or Seller 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps et al. v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 (1975) confirmed the rule 
enunicated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 193 F2d 461 
(1952) that a person who is neither a purchaser or a seller 
may not bring an action under Section 10b of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 or the SEC's Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 
The Court also ruled that since Congress had refused to 
extend Section 10b to cover attempts to purchase or sell, 
the Court would not extend the scope of the present statute 
or rule thereunder. 
The Defendant in this action has consistently claimed 
and maintained that she was not a seller. Therefore, by her 
own admissions she has herself foreclosed the use of Section 
10b and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 
Additonally, since the Defendant retained her shares of 
stock, she would not be a seller under the theory as set 
forth in 0/Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank & 
Trust Co. of Chicago 1979 CCH Federal Securities Law 
Reporter Dec. 96,780 wherein the Court stated that pension 
trustees who entered discretionary trust or agency 
agreements with a bank for investment of funds did not meet 
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the purchaser-seller requirement with respect to securities 
which were retained and ultimately sold. 
Since the Defendant did not meet this element the 10b-5 
claim must fal1. 
B) Use of a Manipulative or Deceptive Device, 
Rule 10b-5 itself requires some manipulative or 
deceptive device. The Defendant in her Amended 
Counter-claim has claimed that the Plaintiff attempted 
without authorization to convert and sell the Defendants 
shares. As set forth above, the evidence clearly shows that 
the Defendant not only authorized the sale but requested it. 
Further, the acts of the Defendant after the sale in 
agreeing to bring in the certificate evidences her 
willingness to enter into the transaction. Since the 
Defendants only claim is that the Plaintiff executed an 
unauthorized sale, and since that sale was in fact 
authorized, a further essential criteria for a violation of 
Rule 10b-5 has not been met and the District Court's 
decision must be reversed. 
C> Scienter. 
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 US 185 (1976) the 
Supreme Court stated that Scienter was an essential element 
for a violation of Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 
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Scienter was defined by the Court to be a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive manipulate or defraud - an 
intentional or wilful act* The Defendant has only claimed 
the alleged unauthorized sale as a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated: 
"The Court has learned to its frustration 
during this trial that the Defendants testimony 
is extremely difficult to follow, particularly 
when she is excited. The Salt Lake Broker 
interpreted the conversation to be a request for 
a stock sale." (Page 276) 
The District Court clearly found at most that there was 
a good faith misunderstanding regarding the stock sale. 
Thus there was no finding of intentional or wilful 
misconduct relating to the sale and no finding of scienter 
can stand relating to the sale and thus no violation of Rule 
10b-5. 
In additon, in facts similar to this case, the Ninth 
Circuit in Brophy v. Redivo, et al. 1984 CCH Federal 
Securities Law Reporter 99,676 stated: 
"Ms. Brophy argues that Blyth, Eastman, 
through Mr. Redivo, traded on her account without 
authority and by doing so violated section 10b 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 78j, and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Because we are 
reviewing the granting of a directed verdict 
for the defendants, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff and therefore 
assume that defendants'" August trades on Ms. 
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Brophy/s account were unauthorized. We must 
then answer a question previously unaddressed 
by this court: Does unauthorized trading, 
without more, constitute a violation of Rule 
10b-5? We hold it does not." Cat 97,723). 
In the case before the court, the Defendants only 
allegations relating to the 10b-5 claim are unauthorized 
trading. Under the holding in the Brophy case no cause of 
action lies pursuant to 10b-5. Under the Brophy case and 
the Ernst & Ernst case it is clear that the Defendant has 
failed to meet her burden in proving scienter and thus the 
District Court/s ruling must be reversed. 
D. DAMAGES 
A civil right of action pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act and Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10 
thereunder, requires as an element of the violation, some 
injury or damages. James et al. v. Meinke 85-86 CCH Federal 
Securities Law Reporter Dec. 92,417; Herman MacLean v. 
Huddleston (Ca-5 1981) 1981 CCH Federal Securities Law 
Reporter 97,919 640 F2d 534 (1981); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. 
v. Penham (SDNY) 547 F Supp 1286; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 
Corp., 193 F2d 461; Blue Chip Stamps vs. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975). The District Courts Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment show no injury to the Respondent. 
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The District Court did not make an award of any actual, 
general, nominal nor compensatory damages, nor was 
Respondent granted any equitable relief. Obviously an 
essential element for a violation of 10b-5 was not found by 
the District Court and therefore its decision must be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT NO. Ill - RULE 10B-10 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE 
10B-10. 
The elements requsite for a showing of violation of 
Rule 10b-10, since it was adopted pursuant to Section 10 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as was Rule 10b-5, are 
similar to those required for a showing of violation of Rule 
10b-5. Those elemnts include: 
a) The person claiming the violation must be a 
purchaser or seller. 
b) Scienter must be alleged and shown. 
c> There must be proof of violation of one of the 
listed requirements in Rule lQb-10. 
d) The person claiming the violation must show actual 
damages. 
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A) Purchaser or Seller and Damages 
The elements that there be a Purchaser or Seller and 
Damages are identical as set forth under Argument II. Since 
the Defendant has failed to prove these elements the 
District Courts Decision must be reversed. 
B) Scienter 
As to the requirement of Scienter, the only evidence 
was the testimony of Johnson that every effort was made to 
send out a confirmation of the sale. There are no 
allegations of Scienter in Defendant's Amended Counter-Claim 
and no findings of scienter in the District Court's ruling. 
On this element alone the decision must be reversed. 
C) Rule lOb-10 Listed Requirements 
In order to sustain a finding of violation of Rule 
10b-10, one of the reuirements enumerated in the rule must 
be shown to have been violated. The District Court's only 
Findings in regards to Rule 10b-10 was that the Plaintiff 
failed to give notice of the sales transaction. (Page 289). 
In its Conclusions the Court stated the Plaintiff had 
violated Rule 10b-10 by failing to provide a notice in 
writtlng of the sale transaction to the Defendant. As set 
forth in Argument No. I, the Plaintiff believes it has shown 
that a notice was in fact given to the Defendant. However, 
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as to this element, the District Court clearly required the 
burden of proof incorrectly. The burden of proof in Section 
10 actions is clearly on the one claiming a violation. 
Herman MacLean v. Huddleston 640 F2d 534 C1981). The 
District Court in this action in its Memordandum Decision 
stated "The Court concludes that the Plainitff has failed to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such a 
notice was given.M (Page 277). Placing the burden on the 
Plaintiff was erroneous and the Courts finding on this 
element alone requies a reversal of the District Court's 
decision. 
The Defendant has failed to prove even one of the 
elements necessary to sustain a violation of Rule 10b-10, 
much less all of the required elements and therefore the 
Court's decision must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT NO. IV - NASD RULES 
In order for the Defendant to prevail in an action for 
violation of NASD Rules, she must show that she has a 
private right of action to bring a suit pursuant to NASD 
Rules. In addition, the Defendant must prove and findings 
must be entered regarding each of the elements of a 
violation of those Rules. 
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A> Private Right of Action. 
The NASD, National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. is a private corporation which was organized pursuant 
to authority given under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The Corporation is not a government agency. In order 
for the Defendant to prevail on her allegations of violation 
of any NASD rules she must show a private right to enforce 
those rules and recover for losses occasioned thereunder. 
The District Court never acknowledged that private right of 
action nor were any Findings of such a right made; without 
such Defendants cause of action must fail. 
B) Elements for Violation 
The Tenth Circuit while not granting a private right of 
action for NASD violations, in dicta indicated that if a 
Private Right of Action were to exist for violation of NASD 
Rules then one of the requirements would be a showing of 
scienter. Utah State University v. Bear Stearns et al. 549 
F2d 164 (1976) 10th Cir. The Defendant made no allegations 
in her Amended Counter-Claim and the District Court made no 
findings of Scienter as to any of the alleged violations of 
NASD rules and therfore the allegations in this regard must 
fail and the District's Court's decision in this regard must 
be reversed. The Tenth Circuit Court's reasoning as to 
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whether a private right of action exists under NASD rules 
parallels the U.S. Supreme Court/s reasoning in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hockfelder 425 US 185 (1976), wherein it granted a 
private right of action in Section 10b cases. It is 
therefore appropriate that since the basis for a cause of 
action under 10b requires that damages be proved and found 
to exist, that similarly, damages are an essential element 
for a private right of action for violation of NASD rules, 
if such private right exists. 
The District Court/s Findings, Conclusions and Judgment 
show no injury to the Defendant. The District Court did not 
make an award of any actual, general, nominal nor 
compensatory damages, nor was Defendant granted any 
equitable relief. Without a finding of actual damages, no 
violation can exist and the District Court/s ruling must be 
reversed. 
C) Specific Requiremnts of the Alleged NASD Rules. 
A review of each of the substantive portions of the 
NASD rules must be made and violation must be shown for 
there to be a violation. 
Section 12. 
Section 12 requires the delivery of a confirmation and 
specifies the information the confirmation must contain. No 
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findings were made that the confirmation, Exhibit 3Pf did 
not contain the required information* The issue of whether 
the confirmation was delivered has been discussed previously 
in detail in the Arguments above and specifically in 
Argument III relating to Rule 10b-10. Since the elements 
were not shown, the District Court's decision in this matter 
must be reversed. 
Section 18. 
This section closely parallels the prohibitions of Rule 
10b-5 and were discussed in detail in Argument No. II above. 
Since the allegations were not sustained nor proven as set 
forth above in Argument II, the decision of violation under 
this Rule must also be reversed. 
Section 21<a8cb) 
This section requires that the books and records of the 
Plaintiff must be kept as set forth therein and that certain 
information must be kept by the Plaintiff regarding its 
customers. There is no evidence nor findings that the 
Plaintiff's books and records were kept other than as set 
forth in the rule and thus the ruling of violation of this 
section must be reversed. 
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Paragraphs 2761 and Paragraph 2162 Sections 1 and 9. 
There is no paragraph 2761 in the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice, nor are there Section 1 and 9 in paragraph 2162 of 
the Rules of Fair Practice and therefore the decision as to 
these must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT NO. V - PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
An award of punitive damages can only be upheld if 
there is some proper basis upon which that award can rely. 
It is well settled law that recovery pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is limited to actual loss as 
mandated by Section 28(a) of the Act and that an award of 
punitive damages is not allowed pursuant to a private right 
of action for violation of Section 10 and Rules promulgated 
thereunder. Green v. Wolf Corp. 406 F2d 291 (1968); 
Richardson v. MacArthur 451 F2d 35 (1971); Vogel v. Trahan 
(ED Pa Jan 11, 1980) 79-80 CCH Federal Securities Law 
Reporter Dec 92,321; Jones v. Miles 81-82 CCH Federal 
Securities Law Reporter Dec 98,276 (Ca-5 1981); de Haas v. 
Empire Petroleum Company 435 F2d 1223 (1970). The Court in 
Green v. Wolf Corp. Supra, at page 302 stated that Section 
28(a) limited recovery in private suits pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to actual damages. This was 
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Richardson v. MacArthur, 
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Supra, at page 45 wherein the Court stated that Section 
28(a) limited "recovery in private suits for damages to 
Actual damages4'." Since the NASD itself and all rules 
promulgated thereunder have effect pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 15A, only actual 
damages would be allowed and punitive damages specifically 
not permitted. Thus the award of punitive damages was error 
and should therefore be reversed. 
On a separate theory, punitive damages would not be 
available to Defendant in this matter in that this Court in 
Cohn vs. J.C. Penney 537 P2d 306, at page 311, held that 
special damages must be plead in order to be awarded unless 
the "pleadings contain such information as will apprise the 
defendant of such damages as must of necessity flow from 
that which is alleged." The necessity for pleading punitive 
damages should require no less, since this Court has found 
that an award of punitive "constitutes an extraordinary 
remedy outside the field of usual redressful remedies..." 
First Security Bank of Utah v. JBJ Feedyards, Inc. 653 P2d 
591 (1982). Since as shown above, punitive damages are not 
allowable pursuant to 10b-5, 10b-10 and NASD rules, and 
since these are the only claims for relief plead by the 
Defendant, these violations plead by the Defendant fail to 
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contain such information as would appraise the Plaintiff of 
the necessity to defend relative to punitive damages. 
Without having requested punitive damages nor having plead 
sufficient information so as to appraise Plaintiff regarding 
the need to defend against such damages, an award of 
punitive damages was error and should be reversed* 
The award of punitive damages must also be reversed 
alternatively on another basis in that this Court has 
consistently held that there must be some relationship 
between actual damages and an award of punitive damages, 
First Security Bank v. JBJ Feedyards, Inc. Supra; Bundy v. 
Century 692 P2d 754 (1984); Cruz v. Montoya 660 P2d 723 
(Utah 1983); or there must be at least some grant of 
equitable relief. Nash v. Craigco 585 P2d 775 (1978). In 
this case, the District court did not find nor award any 
actual, compensatory, nominal damages nor grant any 
equitable relief. Defendant may content that equitable 
relief was granted wherein the Court ruled that she was the 
sole owner of her shares of stock and that the Plaintiff had 
no ownership interest therein. In fact, however, no such 
relief was granted since Plaintiff had never claimed any 
ownership of Defendants stock and was only claiming that 
Defendant owed to Plaintiff a sum of money. While the Court 
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had properly granted a Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment to 
ensure funds were available in the event Plaintiff was 
sucessful on its claim, the elimination of the Writ of 
Attachment was not a grant of equitable relief but merely 
the logical result of a finding that Plaintiff had not 
proved its case and was not entitled to relief* Therefore, 
since no damages were granted to the Defendant, no grant of 
punitive damages is sustainable and the entry of such an 
award was error and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT NO. VI - MISCELLANEOUS FINDINGS 
The Court entered various Findings which were not 
alleged by the Plaintiff or the Defendant and which are not 
sustainable by the facts and law. Each Findings is treated 
separately. 
A SECURITY CANNOT BE SOLD WITHOUT THE POSSESSION OF A 
CERTIFICATE 
The District Court ruled that a sale of securities 
cannot take place without the presence of the stock 
certificate. Common usage and knowledge reflects that sales 
of securities are made common place without the certificate 
in possession. Short sales, or sales made in anticipation 
of a drop in price wherein the seller can purchase the 
shares at a lower price to cover the previous sale are 
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commonplace and executed daily. The District Courts 
findings should be reversed. 
THE PLAINTIFF PURCHASED THE DEFENDANT STOCK TO PREVENT 
PROFIT TAKING BY THE DEFENDANT. 
The evidence as set forth above is that the defendant 
contacted the Plaintiff in order to sell her shares. There 
is no evidence that the Plaintiff ever had any means of 
obtaining Defendant's certificate and thereby preventing her 
later sale and profit. The District Court's Finding must be 
reversed. 
THAT THE MOTIVE TO PURCHASE THE DEFENDANT'S STOCK WAS 
IMPROPER OR ILLEGAL. 
The District Court's finding that the commission on the 
sale of the defendant's shares was small and that therefore 
there must have been some other reason for the sale is not 
supported by the facts. The Defendant's sale was of over 
*3f000 and the commission would therefore be several hundred 
dollars. The amount of money for the work necessary was not 
disporportionate to trades in the Salt Lake Market. There 
is no evidence that the purchase of the shares would result 
in any improper or illegal use of the shares. 
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THAT THE REASON THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVED HER SHARE 
CERTIFICATE FROM THE TRANSFER AGENT WAS TO FURTHER SOME 
ALLEGED SCHEME. 
There is no evidence that the Plaintiff had any control 
over the Transfer Agent or could in any manner restrict the 
delivery of the Defendants certificate. The District 
Courts Finding in this matter is without basis and must be 
reversed. 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO CLOSE ALL SALE 
TRANSACTIONS WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF THE TRANSACTION. 
The Plaintiff's account card (Exhibit IP) requires the 
customer to complete their transactions by the fifth 
business day. However, the Account Card specifically allows 
the Plaintiff the option of allowing a transaction to remain 
open or to close the transaction at their discretion. The 
wording on the Account Card is plain and the Court's 
interpretation otherwise is error and must be reversed. 
THAT A CONVERSION OF THE DEFENDANT'S SHARES OCCURED. 
The Court's Findings in paragraph 7, and Conclusions in 
paragraphs 1 and 5 indicate that the Defendant's shares 
where converted. In fact, as set forth above, the Issuer of 
the shares owned by the Defendant changed its name and 
effected a reverse stock split. The changing of a corporate 
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name and stock split is not a conversion of securities and 
the Courts Findings and Conclusion must be reversed. 
THAT ILLEGAL INSIDER ACTIVITY OCCURED AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD ANY HOLD OR CONTROL OVER VENTURE CONSOLIDATED. 
The Court/s Judgment indicates that the Plaintiff had 
an involvment and hold and control over Venture 
Consolidated. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff ever 
had sufficient stock to control or maintain a hold over 
Venture Consolidated. In fact the only testimony is by 
Johnson and is that the Plaintiff never had such hold or 
control by way of stock ownership. (Page 518). There is no 
evidence of any other type of hold or control which 
Plaintiff was alleged to have had. Further, there is no 
evidence that the Plaintiff was in possession of any 
information which could be considered "inside information". 
The only information about Venture Consolidated was that 
information which was found in Exhibit 2P which the 
Defendant acfrnitted to having received prior to the sale and 
at the approximately time it was distributed to shareholders 
generally. (Page 400-1). 
THAT A CHEAT OF THE STOCK BUYING PUBLIC IN GENERAL OCCURED. 
The District Courts Conclusions and Judgment indicate 
that the Plaintiff acted in such a manner so as to deceive 
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and cheat the public in general. There is no evidence that 
the general public was ever cheated in any manner and in any 
way by the Plaintiff. This should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and evidence before this Court require a 
reversal of the District Court's decision and the entry of a 
Judgment against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiff in 
the amount of *5404.20 plus interest from the date of the 
sale transaction, attorneys fees and costs. Further that 
the decision as to violations by the Plaintiff of Rules 
10b-5, 10b-10 and NASD Rules must be reversed. The entry of 
a Judgment in favor of the Defendant for punitive damages 
was improper and must be reversed. The various 
miscellaneous Findings and Conclusions and Judgments as set 
forth above must be reversed. 
Dated this 18th day of May, 1987. 
CraigkT. McCu though—• :°—~ 
Attorney" for Plaintiff-Appellant 
185 South State Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0378 
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postage prepaid in the United States Mail, a copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant addressed to Gerald S. Wight, Attorney for 
Defendant-Respondent, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden 
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ADDENDUM 
Contents 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-10 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
Memorandum Decision 
1 6, 6 1 9 - 2 Exchange Act—Manipulations 
[fl 22,729k] Confirmation of Transactions 
i^ —>- Rule 10b-10 is amended. See below. 
Reg. §240.10b-10. (a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to 
effect for or with the account of a customer any transaction in, or to induce 
the purchase or sale by such customer of, any security (other than U.S. Sav-
ings Bonds or municipal securities) unless such broker or dealer, at or 
before completion of such transaction, gives or sends to such customer writ-
ten notification disclosing 
(1) Whether he is acting as agent for such customer, as agent for some 
other person, as agent for both such customer and some other person, or as 
principal for his own account; and 
(2) The date and time of the transaction (or the fact that the time of 
the transaction will be furnished upon written request of such customer) and 
the identity, price and number of shares or units (or principal amount) of 
such .security purchased or sold by such customer; and 
(3) In the case of any transaction in a debt security subject to redemp-
tion before maturity, a statement to the effect that such debt security may 
be redeemed in whole or in part before maturity, that such a redemption 
could affect the yield represented and that additional information is available 
upon request; and [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (TJ83,341), April 18, 
1983, effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(4) In the case of a transaction in a debt security effected exclusively 
on the basis of a dollar price 
(i) The dollar price at which the transaction was effected, and 
(ii) The yield to maturity calculated from the dollar price; Provided, 
however, that this paragraph (ii) shall not apply to a transaction in a debt 
security with a maturity date that may be extended by the issuer thereof, 
with a variable interest rate payable thereon, or a participation interest 
in notes secured by liens upon real estate continuouslv subject to pre-
payment; and [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), April 18, 1983, 
effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(5) In the case of a transaction in a debt security effected on the basis 
of yield 
(i) The yield at which the transaction was effected, including the 
percentage amount and its characterization (e.g., current yield, yield to 
maturity, or yield to call) and if effected at yield to call, the type of call, 
the call date and call price; 
(ii) The dollar price calculated from the yield at which the transaction 
was effected; and 
(iii) If effected on a basis other than yield to maturity and the yield 
to maturity is lower than the represented yield, the yield to maturity as 
well as the represented yield; Provided, however, that this paragraph (iii) 
shall not apply to a transaction in a debt security with a maturity date 
that may be extended by the issuer thereof, with a variable interest rate 
payable thereon, or a participation interest in notes secured by liens upon 
real estate continuously subject to preoavment; and [Adopted in Release 
No. 34-19687 (<[ 83,341), April 18, 1983, effective January 1, 1984* 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(6) Whether any odd-lot differential or equivalent fee has been paid by 
such customer in connection with the execution of an order for an odd-lot 
number of shares or units for principal amount) of a security and that 
the amount of any such differential or fee will be furnished upon oral or 
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written request; Provided, however, That such disclosure need not be made 
if the differential or fee is included in the remuneration disclosed, or exempted 
from disclosure, pursuant to paragraph (a)(7)(H) ; and [Amended in Release 
No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(7) If he is acting as agent for such customer, for some other person, 
or for both such customer and some other person, 
(i) The name of the person from whom th« security was purchased, or 
to whom it was sold, for such customer or the fact that such information 
will be furnished upon written request of such customer; and 
(ii) The amount of any remuneration received or to be received by him 
from such customer in connection with the transaction unless remuneration 
paid by such customer is determined, pursuant to a written agreement with 
such customer, otherwise than on a transaction basis; and 
(iii) The source and amount of any other remuneration received or to 
be received by him in connection with the transaction; Provided, however, 
That if, in the case of a purchase, the broker was not participating in a 
distribution, or in the case of a sale, was not participating in a tender offer, 
the written notification may state whether any other remuneration has been 
or will be received and that the source and amount of such other remunera-
tion will be furnished upon written request of such customer; and 
(8) If he is acting as principal for his own account 
^ - > Rule 10b-10(a)(8)(i) is amended. See below. 
(i) The amount of any mark-up, mark-down, or similar remuneration 
received in a transaction in an equity security if he is not a market makei 
in that security and if, after having received an order to buy from sue! 
customer, he purchased the security from another person to offset a con 
temporaneous sale to such customer or, after having received an order t< 
sell from such customer, he sold the security to another person to offset ; 
contemporaneous purchase from such customer; and 
•>B ••> Reproduced below is the text of Rule 10b-10(a)(8)(i) as amended 
in Release No. 34-22397 ffl 83\912), effective March 17, 1986. 
( i)(A) If he is not a market maker in that security and, if, afte 
having received an order to buy from such customer, he purchased th 
security from another person to offset a contemporaneous sale to such cus 
tomer or, after having received an order to sell from such customer, h 
sold the security to another person to offset a contemporaneous purchas 
from such a customer, the amount of any mark-up, mark-down, or simila 
remuneration received in an equity security; or 
(B) In any other case of a transaction in a reported security, th 
trade price reported in accordance with an effective transaction reportin 
plan, the price to the customer in the transaction, and the difference, 
anv, between the reported trade price and the price to the customer. [Amende 
in'Release No. 34-22397 (fl 83,912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.] 
(ii) In the case of a transaction in an equity security, whether he is 
market maker in that security (otherwise than by reason of his acting as 
block positioner in that security). 
(b) A broker or dealer may effect transactions for or with the accoui 
of a customer without giving or sending to such customer the writte 
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section if 
(1) Such transactions are effected pursuant to a periodic plan or s 
investment company plan; and 
Federal Securities Law Reports Reg. § 240.1 Ob-1 0 11 22 ,729 
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(2) Such broker or dealer gives or sends to such customer within five busi-
ness days after the end of each quarterly period a written'statement disclosing 
each purchase or sale, effected for or with, and each dividend or distribution 
credited to, or reinvested for, the account of such customer (pursuant to the 
plan) during the period; the date of each such transaction; the identity, 
number and price of any securities purchased or sold by such customer in 
each such transaction; the total number of shares of such securities in such 
customer's account; any remuneration received or to be received by the 
broker or dealer in connection therewith; and that any other information 
required by paragraph (a) will be furnished upon written request; Provided, 
however, That the quarterly written statement may be delivered to some other 
person designated by the customer for distribution to the customer; and 
[Amended in Release No. 34-19687 (ft 83,341), effective July 25, 1983, 48 F. R. 
17583.] 
(3) In the case of transactions effected pursuant to an investment com-
pany plan 
(i) Payments for the purchase of securities by such customer or by such 
customer's designated agent are made directly to, or made payable to, the 
registered investment company, or the principal underwriter, custodian, 
trustee, or other designated agent of the registered investment company; and 
(ii) The intention to give or send to the customer the written statement 
referred to in subparagraph (b)(2) of this paragraph, in lieu of the written 
notification required by paragraph (a), is disclosed in writing to such customer. 
(c) A broker or dealer may effect transactions for or with the account 
of a customer without giving or sending to such customer the written 
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section if 
(1) Such transactions are effected in shares of any no-load open-end 
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
that attempts to maintain a constant net asset value per share and that holds 
itself out to be a "money market" fund or has an investment policy calling 
for investment of at least 80% of its assets in debt securities maturing in 
thirteen months or less; and 
(2) Such broker or dealer gives or sends to such customer within five 
business days after the end of each monthly period a written statement 
disclosing each purchase or redemption, effected for or with, and each divi-
dend or distribution credited to, or reinvested for, the account of such 
customer during the month; the date of each such transaction; the identity, 
number and price of any securities purchased or redeemed by such customer 
in each such transaction: the total number of shares of such securities in 
such customer's account; any remuneration received or to be received by 
the broker or dealer in connection therewith ; and that any other informa-
tion required by paragraph (a) will be furnished upon written request; and 
(3) Such customer is provided with prior notification in writing dis-
closing the intention to send the written information referred to in paragraph 
(c)(1) on a monthly basis in lieu of an immediate confirmation. 
[Paragraph (c) as adopted in Release No. 34-196S7 (fl 83,341 \ effective 
July 25, 1983, 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(d) A broker or dealer shall °-ive or send to a customer information 
requested pursuant to this rule within five business days of receipt of the 
request; Provided, however, That in the case of information pertaining to a 
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transaction effected more than 30 days prior to receipt of the request, the 
information shall be given or sent to the customer within 15 business days. 
(e) For the purposes of this rule, 
(1) "Customer" shall not include a broker or dealer; 
(2) "Completion of the transaction" shall have the meaning provided 
in Rule 15cl-l under the Act; 
(3) "Time of the transaction" means the time of execution, to the extent 
feasible, of the customer's order; 
(4) "Debt security" as used in paragraph (a ) (3) , (a) (4) , and (a)(5) 
only, means any security, such as a bond, debenture, note, or any other 
similar instrument which evidences a liability of the issuer (including any 
such security that is convertible into stock or a similar security) and frac-
tional or participation interests in one or more of any of the foregoing; 
Provided, however, that securities issued by an investment company regis-
tered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 shall not be included in 
this definition; [Adopted in Release No. 34-19687 (fl83,341), April 18, 1983, 
effective January 1, 1984, 48 F. R. 17583.] 
(5) "Periodic plan" means any written authorization for a broker acting 
as agent to purchase or sell for a customer a specific security or securities 
(other than securities issued by an open end investment company or unit 
investment trust registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940), in 
specific amounts (calculated in security units or dollars), at specific time 
intervals and setting forth the commissions or charges to be paid by the 
customer in connection therewith (or the manner of calculating them) ; and 
(6) "Investment company plan" means any plan under which securities 
issued by an open-end investment company or unit investment trust regis-
tered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are purchased or sold by 
a customer pursuant to 
(i) An individual retirement or individual pension plan qualified under 
the Internal Revenue Code; or 
(ii) A contractual or systematic agreement under which the customer 
purchases at the applicable public offering price, or redeems at the applicable 
redemption price, such securities in specified amounts (calculated in security 
units or dollars) at specified time intervals and setting forth the commissions 
or charges to be paid by such customer in connection therewith (or the 
manner of calculating them) ; or 
(iii) Any other arrangement involving a group of two or more cus-
tomers and contemplating periodic purchases of such securities by each 
customer through a person designated by the group; Provided, That such 
arrangement requires the registered investment company or its agent 
(A) To give or send to the designated person, at or before the com-
pletion of the transaction for the purchase of such securities, a written 
notification of the receipt of the total amount paid by the group; 
(B) To send to anyone in the group who was a customer in the prior 
quarter and on whose behalf payment has not been received in the current 
quarter a quarterly written statement reflecting that a payment was not 
received on his behalf; and 
(C) To advise each customer in the group if a pavment is not received 
from the designated person on behalf of the group within 10 days of a date 
certain specified in the arrangement for delivery of that payment by the 
Federal Securities Law Reports Reg. §240.10b-10 II 22,729A 
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designated person and thereafter to send to each such customer the written 
notification described in paragraph (a) of this section for the next three 
succeeding payments. 
i)B > Reproduced below is the text of Rule 10b-10(e)(7) and (8) as added 
ID Release No. 34-22397 (fl 83,912), effective March 17, 1986. 
(7) "Reported security" shall have the meaning provided in Rule 
HAa3-l under the Act. [Added in Release No. 34-22397 (If 83,912), effective 
March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.] 
(8) "Effective transaction reporting plan" shall have the meaning pro-
vided in Rule l lAa3-l under the Act. [Added in Release No. 34-22397 (jl 83,-
912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.] 
(f) The Commission may exempt any broker or dealer from the require-
ments of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section with regard to specific trans-
actions or specific classes of transactions for which the broker or dealer 
will provide alternative procedures to effect the purposes of this section; 
any such exemption may be granted subject to compliance with such alterna-
tive procedures and upon such other stated terms and conditions as the 
Commission may impose. 
[Adopted in Release No. 34-13508 (fl 81,143), effective January 1, 1978, 
with the exception of paragraphs (b) , (c), (d) and (e) , which are effective 
June 1. 1977, 42 F. R. 25323; amended in Release No. 34-14184 (fl 81,367), ef-
fective date postponed until April 1, 1978, 42 F. R. 60734; Release No. 34-
14573 (5181,536), effective date postponed until August 1, 1978, 43 F. R. 
11981: Release No. 34-14942 (ft81,638), effective date postponed until De-
cember 18, 1978, 43 F. R. 30271; Release No. 34-11219 (1181,746), effective 
December 18, 19.78, 43 F. R. 47503; Release No. 34-19687 (fl 83,341), April 
18, 1983. effective July 25, 1983 and January 1, 1984, 48 F. 'R. \7SS3; and 
Release No. 34-22397 fl[ 83,912), effective March 17, 1986, 50 F. R. —.] 
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VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., 
Plaintiff being present in Court and represented by Attorney 
Craig McCullough, and Defendant being present in Court and 
represented by her attorney, Gerald S. Wight, and the Court 
having taken the matter under advisement and subsequently 
issued its Memorandum Decision, does hereby make the follow-
ing Findings of Fact in accordance with that Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Defendant is a 61-year old lady who has 
habitually dabbled in penny stocks usually in the amount of 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO: 92290 
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a few hundred dollars or less, investing in new issues which 
will hopefully achieve a quick rise in value. Plaintiff 
attempted to establish that the Defendant was an experienced 
and sophisticated investor but this is contrary to the facts 
that were brought out at trial, 
2. In 1984 Defendant bought some $200.00 worth of 
penny stocks in a company known as Venture Consolidated 
which at that time amount to 20,000 shares. The particular 
stock was a new issue and a typical penny stock offering and 
the Plaintiff corporation was the market maker of the issue 
and the market which would follow. The plan was to sell 100 
million (100,000,000) shares, or $1,000,000.00 worth and 
eventually insiders captured 23% of the 200,000 plus shares 
sold while the public holding was to be at $200,000.00. The 
investment was principally held in cash in a plan developed 
wherein a shareholders meeting would be called to bring 
about a merger and consolidation with several other corpo-
rations with the resulting entity to be known as Tires, 
Inc., with a 20 to 1 reverse stock split taking place 
immediately thereafter. This particular shareholders 
meeting was to occur on September 19, 1984. In the mean-
time, the Venture Consolidated stock rose from one cent (1C) 
to sixteen (16C) or seventeen (17C) cents, the sole reason 
for the rise apparently being the proposed merger and the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND O 
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general market making activities of the Plaintiff brokerage. 
Due to the activities of Plaintiff and other involved 
parties, the result of their activities was to raise the 
value of Venture Consolidated and eventually the Tires, Inc. 
stocks. This has resulted in the Defendant's original 
$200.00 investment being worth approximately $30,000.00 at 
the time of trial which is primarily based upon the general 
market making activities of the Plaintiff brokerage and/or 
other insiders activity. 
3. That the Plaintiff has at all time maintained an 
Ogden office with the account executive for that office, Lou 
Babcock, being well acquainted with the Defendant. That Mr. 
Babcock visited with the Defendant on September 14, 1984, 
and advised her of the stocks climb in value and offered to 
sell it for her. Such a sale would bring on the recording 
of an additional indication of a fixed value for the market 
making activity, and would serve also to pick up the stock 
in the face of what appeared to be high promotional activity 
in order to prevent profit taking before the explosion in 
value was to occur. That while the motive to sell the 
stocks on commission was no doubt present, the Court does 
find that any such commission would be very small. That the 
Defendant became excited about the potential rise in value 
and decided to obtain a second opinion by placing a call to 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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the Salt Lake office and requesting further information* 
That the broker who received the call interpreted the 
conversation to be a request for a sale of her shares and he 
then contacted the vice-president of the brokerage for 
further instructions on what to do in as much as he knew 
that there was no stock certificate with the Plaintiff 
brokerage. That in spite of this difficulty, the 
vice-present of the brokerage immediately approved the sale 
and the brokerage then made an entry that the purchase was 
made for their market making account. That the Plaintiff 
failed to give notice of the transaction as required by its 
own agreement with the Defendant and by Federal and Asso-
ciation Rules and Regulations. 
5. That the Defendant had no intention of making a 
sale of her shares and was aware of the fact that such a 
sale could not take place without the presence of a stock 
certificate and had in the past had such a sale cancelled as 
opposed to having a purchase made by the broker to cover 
what is known as a "short sale". That one of the reasons 
that the Defendant has never received a stock certificate is 
that it would serve the personal interest of the insiders' 
market making activity to freeze the outsiders and prevent 
their profit taking and interference with the stock's rise 
by making it more difficult for them to "profit take". 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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6. That regulations and the broker's contract itself 
with the Defendant, require a wind up and closing of all 
transactions within five (5) days after a sale or purchase 
occurs. That the Plaintiff brokerage made no effort to 
close in the five (5) day period and that they in fact 
preferred not to do so, preferring instead to await further 
developments. That the stock rose uniformly during the next 
period of time and there was never any drop below the sales 
price so that the brokerage position would be threatened. 
That after approximately seventy-five (75) days, the Plain-
tiff decided to make a transfer purporting to cover the 
short, making an entry that they had bought from their own 
profit making account. That this resulted in a paper 
calculation that if the sale was made in accordance with the 
original sales entry, and a short coverage was effected at 
the repurchase date, that the Defendant would owe the 
$5,400.00 claimed in Plaintiff's Complaint because of the 
rise in the market during the seventy-five (75) days of 
Plaintiff's dalliance. That the Plaintiff knew that it 
would not be closing within five (5) days, even assuming 
that the original sale had actually taken place and let the 
matter ride at the Defendant's risk and should now be 
estopped to make any claim against the Defendant. That the 
Plaintiff brokerage has suffered no damage in that the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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entries made were strictly to and from their own market 
making accounts and records and there is no evidence to 
establish that they were ever in any way threatened in their 
position. That Defendant's shares could not be sold without 
possession of the certificate. 
7. That the Defendant is the rightful owner of the 
20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated which has subsequently 
been converted to lr000 shares of Tires, Inc.f free and 
clear of any and all claims of the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
does hereby arrive at the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That the Plaintiff has failed to establish any 
cause of action against this Defendant and has wrongfully 
attempted to sell her 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated, 
which has since been converted to 1,000 shares of Tires, 
Inc. 
2. That said sale was in violation of Rule 10B(10) 
and 10B(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that 
Western Capital and Securities, Inc., attempted to unlawful-
ly convert the shares of Venture Consolidated held by the 
Defendant and by means and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce or the mails or any facility of any national 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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securities exchange, employed a scheme and made untrue 
statements of material fact, or failed to admit a material 
fact and have engaged in a course of practice which operates 
to defraud the Defendant in that they attempted without any 
authorization whatsoever to convert and sell the securities 
of the Defendant. 
3. That the Plaintiff further acted in violation of 
its own agreement with the Defendant which required a 
settling of all accounts within five (5) business days of 
the transactions, and also Rule 10B(10) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to finalize said transaction 
and further to provide a notice in writing of the same to 
the Defendant as required by Rule 10B(10) and its own agree-
ment. 
4. That in addition, the actions of Western Capital 
and Securities, Inc., are in direct violation and in 
contravention of the NASB Manual Rules of Fair Practice, 
Paragraph 2162, Sections 12, 18, 21(a) (b), and 2761 in 
addition to Sections 1 and 9 of the Paragraph 2162. 
5. That the Defendant is the sole and rightful owner 
of the 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated which have 
subsequently been converted to 1,000 shares of Tires, Inc., 
and said ownership is free and clear of any claims of any 
kind of the Plaintiff, Western Capital and Securities. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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6. That the activity of the Plaintiff in this matter 
is unconscionable and done with the intent to make a profit 
on the stocks generally held in the market making account 
with the risk of loss solely that of the Defendants if there 
should be any lapse in the rise of the stock's value. That 
the Plaintiff is a relatively large brokerage business which 
has branch offices, makes prices and invests for its own 
purposes, etc. That persons in the position of the Defen-
dant are vulnerable to the behind-the-scenes activities of 
entities such as the Plaintiff, and particularly in the 
penny stock market which attracts persons who might other-
wise not be able to afford any losses. That these people 
cannot normally afford the costs and expenses involved in 
litigation if treated unfairly or illegally. 
7. THat the deliberate failure to move towards the 
closing of a transaction, together with the motive of the 
Plaintiff to hold the stock at the Defendant's expense for a 
period of seventy-five (75) days, far in excess of the 
mandatory five (5) day maximum, directly resulted in a cheat 
of the stock buying public and more particularly this 
Defendant, both of which are near helpless in situations 
such as this. 
8. That based upon the size of the transaction, the 
freezing of the stock that eventually reached a high value 
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of $30,000.00, and the assertions of an unconscionable right 
to hold the stock at investor's risk justifies the award of 
punitive damages in the amount of^  $10,000.00. 
DATED th 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
s
-flOHN F./WAHLQUIST HONORABLE^OHN" 7
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, #528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO: 92290 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the 
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close 
of testimony and oral argument, and having previously 
rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as 
follows: 
1. That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed 
no cause of action. 
2. That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 20 
shares of Venture Consolidated which has since^ ' 
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converted by the company to 1,000 shares of Tires, Inc., and 
has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has 
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or 
against the Defendant. 
3. That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule 
10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and 
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the 
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its 
involvement and hold and control over the subject corpo-
ration with the knowledge and inside information of its 
dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all 
such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in at-
tempting to convert her stock, all in violation of all 
applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defen-
dant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in 
the amount of $3^.00. 
4. It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or 
any other entity which has previously been served with or 
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining 
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release 
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant 
upon appropriate application. 
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DATED this ft' day of <?6t£beP, 1986. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^ 0 day of October, 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage 
prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Craig F. McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, #528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COU 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 92290 
The Court has considered the testimony, and the 
exhibits, and the implications drawn therefrom. The defense 
attorney is invited to submit findings of fact and conclusions of 
law consistent with that indicated below. 
FACTS 
1. The defendant is a 61-year old lady. She has 
habitually bought penny stocks. This is usually in the amount of 
a few hundred dollars. She is most interested in new issues that 
will hopefully make a quick rise, even though they may descend 
later. 
2. The plaintiff's witnesses have claimed that the 
defendant was granted concessions because she was an established 
good investor. This is not real. She testified that she bought 
or traded a few hundred dollars per year. Her testimony is not 
refuted. Her stock speculation in the face of financial problems 
brings forth an image of a chronic desperate gambler. 
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3. In 1985 she bought $200 worth of one cent Venture 
Consolidated (20f000 shares). This was a new issue, and a 
typical penny stock offering. The plaintiff corporation was the 
"market maker" of the issue and the market to follow. The plan 
was to sell 100,000,000 shares ($1,000,000 worth). Insiders 
captured 23% of the 200,000 plus shares soldr and the public 
holding was reported to be at $200,000. The investment was 
principally held in cash. A plan developed wherein a share-
holders meeting was to be called to bring about a stock transfer 
with Tires, Inc.r at a 20 to 1 reverse split. This was to occur 
on October 19, 1986. In the meantime, the Venture Consolidated 
stock rose from one cent to sixteen or seventeen cents. There is 
no evidence as to why the stock value rose, except the proposed 
merger and the general market making activities of plaintiff 
brokerage. There is nothing like "discovery of oil on the 
adjoining property" in evidence. The bottom line seems to be 
that a cash injection of something like $200,000 was to raise the 
value of a Venture Consolidated to many times the invested value 
and to further raise the Tire, Inc., stocks. The result was that 
this $200 investment has a market value of in the neigh- borhood 
of $30,000 at trial time. The evidence offers no explanation for 
this rise except the general market making activities of the 
plaintiff brokerage and/or other "insiders1 activity". 
J 4 t 
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4. The plaintiff maintains an Ogden office. The Ogden 
representative was well acquainted with the defendant. He called 
on her place of business on about September 13 or 14, 1985. His 
purpose was to tell her of the stock's climb and to offer to sell 
it for her. Such a sell would bring on the recording of an 
additional indication of a fixed value for the market making 
activity, and would serve also to pick up the stock in the face 
of what appeared to be high promotional activity in order to 
prevent profit taking before the explosion in value was to 
occur. While the motive to sell the stocks on commission is no 
doubt present, the Court notes that such commission would be very 
small. 
5. The defendant was excited. She decided to get a 
"second opinion". After the Ogden office closed, she phoned the 
Salt Lake office and pumped for further information. The Court 
has learned to its frustration during this trial that the defen-
dant's testimony is extremely difficult to follow, particularly 
so when she is excited. The Salt Lake broker interpreted the 
conversation to be a request for stock sale. He contacted the 
vice-president of the brokerage for further instructions on what 
to do inasmuch as he knew that there was no stock certificate 
with the plaintiff brokerage. In spite of this difficulty, the 
vice-president of the brokerage immediately approved the sale. 
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The brokerage then made an entry that the purchase was made for 
their market making account. The question of whether or not a 
notice of this transaction was mailed out or not is in conflict. 
The Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that such a notice was given. 
6. The defendant interpreted the telephone conversation 
in another direction. She had in the past experienced efforts to 
make sales when she did not have a stock certificate and had been 
faced with canceled sales as opposed to purchases by the broker 
to cover what is called "shorts". She assumed that there would 
be no final sale until she was able to get a stock certificate. 
The Court has considered the conflicting evidence as to whether 
or not a stock certificate was actually sent to her or not, and 
has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is that it 
was not sent. This finding is not only based upon the defen-
dants testimony, but also the implication that it would serve 
the personal interests of the insiders1 market making activity to 
freeze the "outsiders" and prevent their profit taking and inter-
ference with the stock1 s rise by making it more difficult for 
them to "profit take". 
7. Regulations and the. broker's contract both require a 
wind up and close of all transactions within five days after a 
sale or purchase occurs. The plaintiff brokerage made no effort 
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to close in the five-day period. They preferred not to do so and 
did await developments. The stock rose uniformly during the next 
period of time. There was never a drop below the sales price, so 
that the brokerage would be threatened. After approximately 75 
days, the plaintiff decided to make a transfer purporting to 
cover the "short". They made an entry that they had bought from 
their profit-making account. The result is that a paper calcula-
tion that if the sale was made in accordance with the original 
sales entryr and a short coverage was effected at the repurchase 
datef that the defendant would owe the $5,000 plus dollars, 
because of the rise in the market during those 75 days. The 
Court rejects this theory in that the plaintiff knew they were 
not closing within 5 days, even if you assume that the original 
sale was made, and let the matter ride at the defendant's risk, 
and should now be estopped to make such claims. The Court finds 
that the brokerage suffered no damages in that the entries made 
were strictly from their market making records. There is no 
evidence that they were ever in any way threatened, she could not 
sell without the stock. 
8. The Court finds that the defendant continues to be 
the owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture Consolidated and/or the 
stock by whatever name it now is known. 
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DAMAGES 
The Court considers that the alleged sale never occurred 
pursuant to the contract. The Court does, however, find that the 
plaintiff1s activity in this instance is unconscionable. It knew 
early that the defendant had denied the original sale had been 
made, but nevertheless the brokerage took no action to close the 
transaction within the five days. It left the situation in an 
ambiguous state. Its intent was that they could make a profit on 
the stocks generally held in the market making account with the 
risk only to the defendant because of the stock's rise in value 
was consistent. The Court is mindful that the evidence in 
general discloses a relatively large brokerage business which has 
branch offices, makes prices, invests for its own purposes, etc. 
The Court is also mindful of the vulnerability of persons in the 
defendants position. It is obvious that the penny market stock 
market is one that attracts persons that might otherwise be in 
the lottery ticket person class. Their purchases are generally 
sufficiently small that they cannot afford litigation if treated 
unfairly. The deliberate failure to move towards the closing of 
a transaction, even if they were correct that a sale occurred and 
an agreement had taken place, their motive was to hold at the 
defendant's expense for the period over the five-day maximum or 
on into what they have testified is their right to hold 
279 
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indefinitelyr and their tying up of the stock certificate requir-
ing lengthy litigation, all results in general cheat of a public 
that is near helpless. The Court has considered the size of the 
transaction, the freezing of stock that eventually reached 
$30,000, and the assertions of an unconscionable right to hold 
the stock investors at risk justifies the award of punitive 
damages in the amount of $10,000. 
DATED this^J* day of October^-1986. 
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